

A COMMUNIST PLOT AGAINST THE FREE WORLD POLICE

[AN EXPOSÉ OF CROWD-HANDLING METHODS]

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JUNE 13, 1961

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STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE POLICE

ALBANY, JUNE 13, 1961

RESOLUTION

Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, That the injunction of secrecy be removed from testimony given in executive session by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, on June 13, 1961; be it further

Resolved, That said testimony be printed and made public.
Dated September 25, 1961.

III

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the reputation of a party be removed from testimony given in executive session of the Senate, on June 14, 1961, and be further resolved, That said testimony be printed and made public.

United States Senate, 1961.

A COMMUNIST PLOT AGAINST THE FREE WORLD POLICE

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1961

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 3234, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Present: Senator Thomas J. Dodd.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator DODD. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Kirkpatrick, I am advised that you have some startling and rather terrifying information about Communist methods of coping with the free world police. I understand, further, that you are willing to impart that information to the Internal Security Subcommittee so that we may pass it on to the American public as a means of protecting themselves against being drawn into a Communist demonstration.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, sir. I have some information along the line you spoke about. I shall be glad to tell the committee what I have learned and I hope it will dull the point of the Communist sickle.

Senator DODD. General, I know it is unnecessary, but it is routine committee procedure. Will you be sworn, sir?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Certainly, Senator.

Senator DODD. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I do.

Senator DODD. Please give your full name and address for the record.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I am Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., inspector general on the staff of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I am stationed in Washington.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Kirkpatrick, just to get you in perspective: Will you give us a brief biography?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Certainly. I was born at Rochester, N.Y.; educated at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and at Princeton University, where I majored in international relations. I was graduated in 1938 and was hired as assistant managing director, later

an editor and personnel director, of the Bureau of National Affairs, a publishing concern which David Lawrence had established to issue several technical journals.

In June 1942, I went to work for the Office of the Coordinator of Information. When the Office of Strategic Services was created from that staff, I was assigned to OSS, went to London, and in 1944, landed with the 1st United States Army in Normandy. I was transferred in August of that year to Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army group and served until V-E Day as General Bradley's G-2 briefing officer. While I was in the United States en route to a new assignment in the China-Burma-India theater, the Japanese surrendered and, after some months, I became an editor of the news magazine, *World Report*, another David Lawrence enterprise.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you become associated with CIA.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. In 1947, when Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg was named Director of the newly established Central Intelligence Group, he asked me to assist in organization of some parts of the undertaking. I took leave from the magazine and have remained with CIA.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you served as Division Chief, Assistant Director, and as executive assistant to the Director before you assumed your present position?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You believe that the organization has become an important facility in the security field and that its services are needed in a cold war as much as in a hot war?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I do. I think it is imperative that the security forces of the free world be kept currently informed of subversive activities anywhere in the world which may affect their countries. I believe, also, that the public should be alerted whenever it appears they are likely to be the unwitting tools or the victims of a specific campaign of subversion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Kirkpatrick, last year the Internal Security Subcommittee published a staff study rounding up details of recent riots against constituted authority all over the free world, including the United States. Copies of that small pamphlet disappeared like magic, indicating, it would seem to me, a deep concern among the American people lest this type of protest should get out of hand.

Now, I am sure those who read that pamphlet, and many others who asked for copies we couldn't supply, will profit by the explanations you gave of handling this form of revolt and the suggestions you offered for avoiding the traps set by the highly skilled Communist agents who may always be found directing these mass upheavals.

Will you proceed, please, at your own pace?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Senators and Mr. Sourwine, many of us know what is back of the mob violence which we have been considering. It is probable, however, that few of the demonstrators realize that they are victims of a war that is being waged in the free world today. It is a life-and-death struggle between communism, which makes the people the slaves of the state, and free world democracy, in which the state carries out the will of the people.

Our police are among the foremost guardians of freedom and thus a major target of the Communists. The better the force, the greater its efficiency, the higher its competence in preserving the peace, the

more vital it is for the Communists to destroy it. I understand it is the committee's desire that I outline the tactics of Communist subversion and describe several case histories illustrating their technique for attacking the police.

The international Communist organization provides a training manual for espionage agents in which their duties are enumerated. This pocket-sized pamphlet was seized in Europe. Let me paraphrase the tasks assigned to agents in one of the countries of the free world.

First, make investigations and report on the activities of the police and security services.

Second, investigate and repress those security organizations which support the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that task include action against such organizations as CIA, the FBI, and even this subcommittee and the House Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I would assume so.

Third, find ways to infiltrate into the police and security organizations to steal documents—particularly those recording their knowledge of communism—and to destroy everything of value.

I believe that the manual is specific enough in those instructions.

Senator DODD. We had sworn testimony a few months ago that almost the first thing the Castro forces did when they took over Havana was to destroy all government records of Communist investigations, including the dossiers of more than 250,000 Communists and Communist supporters.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I have a second example. Let me describe briefly the history of the Communist war against the police in one of the major countries of the free world. I should state initially that this particular country has a long history of excellent police service and a law, dating back many years, requiring that the police force be completely divorced from all politics. Further, until the Communist politicians started to create trouble in recent years there had never been an incident on record showing political interference with the administration of the police force.

In this particular nation there is a national police force which has five levels but is organized on a national, provincial, and local basis. The Communist technique has been directed primarily toward discrediting the police in the eyes of the people. On the local level, Communist troublemakers would start fights in public places in order to involve the local police. When the police went into action, the troublemakers linked arms in an effort to show that it was the police who were causing the incident.

The handbook from which I have been quoting very generously provided graphs or sketches to illustrate this point. Of course, they are designed to facilitate training of Communist agitators. The sketches show, in the most elementary fashion, how crowds can succeed in crushing police opposition. Those not familiar with Communist techniques will more easily understand, by examining the pictures, how a few well-trained Communist agitators can utilize crowds for their purposes. I have photo copies here, somewhat enlarged, which I shall leave with the committee. Attached to each is a brief description of the situation it is designed to portray.




Illustration No. 1.—Shows a crowd coming down the street to face a few policemen who are blocking the path.




Illustration No. 2.—Shows that the police have deployed into two lines opposing crowd. Members in front of the crowd are to engage each policeman so that the rest of the crowd can surge around them.




Illustration No. 3.—Shows that the police have moved into the classic phalanx in order to give mutual protection.




Illustration No. 4.—Shows the crowd swarming around the police in an envelopment.




Illustration No. 5.—Shows the police surrounded and obviously incapable of any further handling of the crowd.






Illustration Nos. 6, 7, and 8.—Show the agitators what to do if the police phalanx comes in from the right. In classic military terms, this would be another envelopment in which the bulk of the crowd passes to the left of the police and then surrounds them.










Illustration Nos. 9, 10, and 11.—Show the identical techniques if the police phalanx comes in from the left.






Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The Communists, of course, try to tell the people that the police are in the pay of foreign powers. Efforts were made to penetrate the police and to recruit personnel in headquarters and provincial offices and in security units. Further, a smear campaign attempted to discredit the leaders among the rank and file. The more outstanding and upright the senior police officers, the more certain they were to become a major Communist target.

As has occasionally happened, the Reds reached cabinet level in this particular country, not as Communists but using a political front party. The Communists in the cabinet paid particular attention to the police, making frequent visits to the police chiefs in charge of provinces to check on such things as administration and security units. One cabinet member demanded that his Communist-front party have full freedom of action and threatened dismissal of police who interfered with Communist agitators. Another cabinet minister, also a member of the Communist-front party, threatened the officer in charge with dismissal because of refusal to release from jail a member of the Communist Party sentenced for an ordinary crime. The chief of the metropolitan police was threatened with disciplinary action because he arrested hired Communist troublemakers who were responsible for a bloody riot in which a large number of police were injured.

The above history is a rather awesome example of Communist techniques against the police. Fortunately I can report that in this instance they failed and, although it was a critical period in the history of this particular country, the fine traditions of the police have been restored and this nation is on the road to true freedom and democracy.

Senator DODD. Mr. Kirkpatrick, suppose the police got the upper hand in a crowd demonstration. What do the Communists do about that?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The Communists are taught how to prevent such a situation, if it is their mob. Here are some graphs which show the situation you have in mind:






Illustration No. 12.—Shows a crowd unprotected by action units.




Illustration No. 13.—Shows police units blocking a street with reserve units capable of moving in any direction in order to act against the crowd and effect its dispersal.




Illustration No. 14.—Shows a crowd protected by action units to engage the police and permit the demonstrators to go on their way which might well be to a riot at the American Embassy.




Illustration No. 15.—Shows how the Communists organize their crowds to frustrate any police attempts to control them. These formations provide maximum flexibility for envelopment tactics.




Illustration No. 16.—Shows once again the use of military-type envelopment techniques with the central column surrounding the small body of police directly in front of them and the two columns on the parallel streets flanking the police in the center.




Illustration No. 17.—Shows another technique for the same problem. The police have blocked the route of march so that the Communists have broken their column into three bodies, moving one to the right and one to the left to flank the police.




Illustration No. 18.—Shows the agitator how to cope with the police roadblock. They divide the crowd into four groups to attack the police from all sides.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. In another country a Communist, under the label of another political party, became the Minister of Interior. He was the direct boss of the Director General of Police—a career police official loyal to his country. The Minister spent most of the 6 months he was in office attempting to find out what the police knew about the Communist Party. Through some fast footwork, at the risk of losing his job, the Director General was able to keep most of the police knowledge away from the Minister.

As you know, there are two general aspects of Communist activity: (1) The subversive aspect where efforts are made to penetrate and control every phase of the political, economic, and cultural life of a country; (2) the militant aspect which involves agitation, demonstrations, riots, insurrection, and rebellion. Police must have a capability of dealing with both the subversive and militant aspects of communism. This requires an internal security mechanism which provides an investigative apparatus capable of identifying and developing information on subversive individuals and organizations and capable of neutralizing their activities. It is also necessary that this highly trained and highly specialized investigative apparatus be supported by a larger force which, in addition to performing routine police duties, must be capable of controlling demonstrations, riots, and other civil disorders.

Lest I give the impression that the Communists are concentrating only upon the newer nations and younger democracies, I would like to mention an incident in an important and major parliamentary power. In this particular country the Communist press specializes in playing up and discrediting all police action against rioters, strikers, and mobs. The Communists have exerted considerable effort to penetrate the police and to sap the morale of the force. Following this pattern, an article was published in a paper of national circulation concentrating on the following themes: that the police were distrusted by the people; that the enlisted personnel of the police were ill treated; that the officers were incompetent; that it was basically a repressive force; that it should be reorganized on regional lines because it did not represent the people.

Here in one place is a listing of the themes used by the Communist subversives in an attempt to undermine police authority, weaken its efficiency, and embarrass the government. It should be noted that the article was written by a confessed member of a wartime Communist espionage network. Unfortunately many readers were unaware of this fact. Here, again, I would say that, despite the Communist efforts against the police in this particular country, they have succeeded in protecting themselves and in continuing a bulwark against illegality and disorder.

Communism will work openly and legally where it can. But it will work secretly and illegally where it must. Its capability for conspiratorial work largely accounts for the survival of the international Communist conspiracy.

This international movement has developed a system of defensive measures to protect itself against the police, against intelligence agencies and against a hostile public. Knowledge of party activities is carefully compartmented. An intraparty detective service and a control commission guard against police penetration.

Plans for offensive action are carefully devised and except for minor local adaptations constitute a detailed blueprint for worldwide agitation.

I have here another group of illustrations from the handbook which will show how the Communists make use of an unorganized crowd. In addition to the agitators or action units, there is always, of course, an invisible cadre of hard-core activists, skilled in inciting mob action and in exploiting civil disorder.




Illustration No. 19.—Shows an unorganized crowd being transformed into two organized groups.




Illustration No. 20.—Shows the same crowd after being organized into two groups protected by advance action units.




Illustration No. 21.—Shows that the police are starting to break up the crowd by driving into the center.




Illustration No. 22.—Shows the agitator how this maneuver can be thwarted by an envelopment movement.




Illustration No. 23.—Shows that the crowd has succeeded in dividing the police into two units, will surround them and render them ineffective.




Illustration No. 24.—Gives the agitator an idea of how to protect a public meeting by stationing action units at the streets leading to the square in which the demonstration is being held.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Separate groups perform other functions for the party such as espionage, sabotage, liquidation, terror, riots, et cetera. When police measures become severe, they establish bases in another country and operate from there. They use every technique of clandestine activity. They are very strict about personal behavior: about alcoholism, private correspondence, friends, mode of living, behavior in case of arrest, professional competence as a clandestine operator.

I would mention here that the Communists will even use fiction in their attacks on the police. I am thinking particularly of one book published quite a few years ago in which there was a chapter devoted to the police with the obvious design of holding them up to ridicule and to undermine the respect of the people.

As a group, the police are among the most anti-Communist of the professional organizations in the free world. There is a natural antipathy between police and Communists. The police learn early in their careers that the Communist Party is not just another political movement but is an international conspiracy. Properly armed with knowledge of the techniques of Communist subversion; alert to the fact that no organization, no group of people, and no individual can be disregarded as a possible Communist target or tool; the police of the free world can counter the Red threat and drive these outlaws from the free world.

None of us should feel that the task is easy, nor that the victory will be quick. The Communists are a dangerous, fiendishly clever, ruthless, determined enemy, and their potential loot the biggest possible—control of the world. They will not give up this goal as long as they last.

The task of containing communism is not made easier by the lack of awareness on the part of many of the Communist threat. Thus one of the first tasks is education—to get the word to the people about the dangers of communism.

In some countries there is an absence of legislation defining "espionage," "sabotage," or "subversion." This plays into the hands of the Communists, and they will go to great extremes to prevent such legislation from being enacted. The absence of such laws puts the police in the position of the boxer whose hands are tied and who is sent into the ring against a killer.

In other countries there is inadequate enforcement of existing laws. And there are technical problems which further handicap police efforts against communism. These include lack of equipment, communications, records, a shortage of trained personnel, and too often an underpaid staff potentially vulnerable to subversion through the lure of money of which the Communists have plenty.

To solve problems such as these, the police must have the support of the government and of the people. In certain of the have-not countries of the free world, the building of a well-trained, disciplined police force, responsive to the needs and the will of the people, is a well-nigh impossible task without external economic and technical assistance. For some years the U.S. Government, through its mutual security program, has fought world communism with a many-pronged attack. It has sought to improve the economic well-being, raise the industrial capacity, and increase the internal security of friendly foreign countries vulnerable to Communist subversion or aggression.

Today there are active U.S. police assistance programs in 26 countries. These programs are designed to provide the police with equipment, communications, records, and transportation needed to do an effective job; to train them in the use of equipment and in modern techniques of patrol and investigation; and, perhaps more important, to instill in them the concept of public service which distinguishes our American police.

The Communists will exert every effort to prevent the development of a strong police force. They will pose as superpatriots, and ruthlessly slander those who oppose them. The Communists will pervert to their own use, words and phrases that have a common meaning in the Western World. Their slogan today is "Struggle for Peace" while they make any area of their choosing into bloody battlefields, turning neighbor against neighbor, and brother against brother.

If we are alert, if we are vigilant, if we are just, the victory will be to the free world. The Communist Party can be paralyzed by an efficient police force. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the police forces in the United States, as well as those of many other countries of the free world, have demonstrated this time and again.

The Communist attack on the police of the free world is dangerous for two reasons: The first is that the attacks are fanatical, disciplined, and skilled in underground methods. Here we can match them. We believe in our cause just as firmly, we are equally disciplined, and we know our jobs.

The second element of Communist strategy and technique is centralization. A campaign against the police of one free country is not planned and directed by the Communist Party of that country; it is planned and directed by the strategists of international communism. Vilification of the police by the Communist press in one country can be—and is—coordinated with plans to penetrate the police in an adjoining country. We can beat them at this game, too.

I attended recently a meeting of the International Association of the Chiefs of Police. Such meetings are the best kind of evidence of our common will to help one another. The more we share our experience, skills, and problems, the better we can deal with their tactics. They cannot divide and conquer, because we are united in the joint defense of our laws and liberties through common bonds. I am glad to have had an opportunity today to present my views to this subcommittee and to congratulate it on the thoughtful work it is doing.

Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Kirkpatrick, in behalf of the subcommittee and of myself, particularly, for the very effective way in which you have turned the tables on the Communists in illustrating your most interesting discussion.

If there are no further questions, the committee will adjourn.

